





















This	 paper	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 draw	 an	 overall	 picture	 of	 the	 transmission	 mechanism	 of	
macroeconomic	policy	tools	(fiscal,	exchange	rate	and	monetary	policies)	in	a	national	economy	
during	the	classical	gold	standard.	I	present	the	empirical	results	based	on	the	SVAR	framework.	
An	 SVAR	analysis	 reveals	 that	 adjustments	 in	 exchange	 rates	 and	monetary	 and	 fiscal	 policy	
pursued	as	policy	tools	played	an	important	role	in	the	recoveries	that	followed	declines	in	GDP	
in	the	period	1874-1913.	In	the	face	of	dramatic	economic	shocks,	the	rigidities	of	the	monetary	





at	 a	 time	when	 the	West	 suffered	 from	 the	problems	of	 deflation.	 The	 results	 in	 this	 paper	











Este	 artículo	 pretende	 trazar	 un	 visión	 general	 de	 los	 mecanismo	 de	 transmisión	 de	 los	
instrumentos	 de	 política	 macroeconómica	 (política	 fiscal,	 cambiaria	 and	 monetaria)	 en	 una	
economía	nacional	durante	el	patrón	oro	clásico.	Presento	los	resultados	empíricos	basados	en	
un	modelo	 SVAR.	 El	 análisis	 SVAR	 señala	 que	 los	 ajustes	 del	 tipo	 de	 cambio	 and	 la	 política	
monetaria	and	fiscal,	entendidas	como	instrumentos	de	política,	jugaron	un	papel	importante	
en	las	recuperaciones	que	siguieron	a	las	caídas	del	PIB	durante	el	periodo	1874-1913.	Frente	a	
los	 grandes	 impactos	 económicos,	 las	 rigideces	 del	 sistema	 monetario	 imposibilitaban	 las	
recuperaciones,	 particularmente,	 en	 los	 países	 de	 la	 periferia.	 Ninguna	 de	 estas	 políticas	 se	
hubiera	podido	llevar	a	cabo	dentro	del	patrón	oro	habiendo	sido	el	impacto	de	las	fluctuaciones	
del	 ciclo	 mucho	 mayor.	 Mi	 análisis	 arroja	 nueva	 luz	 sobre	 el	 funcionamiento	 de	 la	 política	
macroeconómica	en	España	durante	el	patrón	oro	clásico.	El	nivel	del	tipo	de	cambio	fue	clave	











synonymous	 with	 weakness.	 The	 freedom	 to	 allow	 a	
certain	 moderate	 slackening	 in	 the	 exchange	 rate	 in	
times	 of	 general	 depression	 affecting	 the	 rest	 of	 the	




















to	 economic	 growth.	 Membership	 in	 the	 gold	 standard	 was	 a	 sign	 of	 good	 conduct	 and	 it	












A	 large	 proportion	 of	 the	 countries	 on	 the	 periphery	 experienced	 major	 exchange	 rate	
fluctuations	and	instability	(Triffin,	1985,	p.	128).	If	the	economies	of	the	periphery	wished	to	
join	the	gold	standard,	they	were	required	to	enact	painful,	sometimes	untenable	adjustments	
to	 their	 national	 economy3.	 The	 countries	 of	 Europe’s	 southern	 periphery,	 such	 as	 Italy	 and	
Portugal,	 were	 unable	 to	 remain	within	 the	 gold	 standard.	 The	 structural	 problems	 of	 their	
economies	prevented	them	from	bringing	their	money	supply	under	control	and	keeping	their	
exchange	rate	stable.					
The	 economies	 on	 the	 periphery	 were	 debtors	 in	 the	 global	 financial	 system,	making	 them	
vulnerable	to	the	withdrawal	of	funds	in	times	of	financial	constraint	(De	Cecco,	1974;	Temin,	











Studying	 the	 individual	 experiences	 of	 countries	 on	 the	 periphery	 under	 the	 classical	 gold	
standard	has	enhanced	our	understanding	of	 the	periphery	 in	 this	 period.	 In	 short,	 the	 gold	













The	 case	 of	 the	 Spanish	 economy	 offers	 an	 opportunity	 to	 analyse	 the	 behaviour	 of	
macroeconomic	 variables	 in	 the	 only	 Western	 country	 to	 remain	 always	 outside	 the	 gold	
standard7.	There	is	no	consensus	over	whether	the	non-adoption	of	the	gold	standard	benefited	




































2,500	million	 pesetas10.	 Finally,	 in	 a	 last	 attempt	 to	 improve	 the	 price	 of	 the	 peseta	 on	 the	


































































late	 eighteen-eighties,	 losing	 value	 particularly	 between	 1888	 and	 1900.	 The	 exchange	 rate	
depreciated	 by	 26.6%	 between	 1883	 and	 1891.	 By	 contrast,	 between	 1893	 and	 1898	 the	
depreciation	was	36%,	 the	highest	 in	 the	period	 (Figure	1).	Could	any	of	 these	policies	have	








seeks	 to	 estimate	 the	 magnitude	 of	 their	 effects.	 To	 this	 end,	 an	 SVAR	 (structural	 vector	
autoregression)	 model	 is	 constructed	 using	 two	 variables	 relating	 to	 the	 state	 of	 the	 real	





For	 the	 Spanish	 case,	 this	 type	 of	 study	 has	 no	 precedents	 for	 the	 period	 spanning	 the	 late	
nineteenth	and	early	 twentieth	 centuries.	However,	 the	methodology	has	been	used	by	Cha	
(2003)	 and	 by	 Shibamoto	 and	 Shizume	 (2014)	 to	 capture	 the	 magnitudes	 of	 the	 effects	 of	
macroeconomic	policies	in	Japan,	by	Gordon	and	Krenn	(2010)	to	measure	the	same	effects	in	
the	US,	and	by	Mattesini	and	Quintieri	 (1997)	 in	the	Italian	case,	among	others15.	Shibamoto	












sizes16.	 The	most	 important	 limitation	 is	 that	 the	 results	 from	 a	 small	 sample	 can	 be	more	
imprecise.	This	paper	confirms	how	expansionary	monetary	and	fiscal	policy	and	adjustments	in	




sustaining	 Spanish	 economic	 growth	 and	 being	 able	 to	 overcome	 fluctuations	 in	 the	 cycle,	
promoting	exports	and	raising	domestic	prices,	while	avoiding	deflation	abroad.		
The	paper	is	organised	as	follows:	section	2	describes	the	methodology	and	the	data;	section	3	





fiscal	 and	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 on	 real	 GDP.	 To	 achieve	 this	 aim	 and	 analyse	 the	 dynamic	
relationship	between	macroeconomic	variables,	the	following	VAR	model	is	constructed	using	
the	variables	of	output	(𝑦"),	price	index	(𝑝"),	fiscal	balance	(𝑓"),	exchange	rate	(𝑒")	and	money	
stock	(𝑚"):	 𝐵 𝐿 𝑋" = 𝑏, + ɛ"	
where	 𝑋" = 𝑦", 𝑝", 𝑓", 𝑒", 𝑚" ,	 𝑏,is	 the	 vector	 of	 the	 constant,	 𝐵 𝐿 = 𝐵, − 𝐵1𝐿1 − ⋯−𝐵3𝐿3	is	a	p-th	order	lag	that	forms	a	matrix	𝐵5 = 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑝 	such	that	the	diagonal	elements	
of	 𝑏,	 are	 equivalent	 to	 1	 and	 ɛ" = ɛ9", ɛ3", ɛ:", ɛ;", ɛ<" 	 is	 a	 five-by-one	 vector	 of	 serially	
uncorrelated	structural	disturbances	with	a	mean	zero	and	a	covariance	matrix	Σɛ.	Following	the	
order	of	Shibamoto	and	Shizume	(2014),	the	macroeconomic	variables	are	put	first	(real	GDP	
and	 price	 index)	 and	 then	 the	 policy	 tool	 variables	 are	 added	 (fiscal	 balance,	 real	 effective	
exchange	 rate	 and	 money	 stock).	 This	 order	 assumes	 that	 politicians	 first	 observe	 their	







because	 it	was	 determined	 independently	 of	 the	 other	 available	 policies18.	 Then	 comes	 the	
exchange	 rate,	 which	 being	 flexible	 could	 act	 freely	 as	 a	 cushion	 or	 shock	 absorber	 for	 the	
economy,	and	monetary	policy	comes	last19.		
The	structural	model	is	as	follows:	 𝐴 𝐿 𝑋" = 𝑎, + 𝑢"	











































































1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
Output shocks


























1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
Exchange rate shocks
a. Lyon stock market crisis
b. Stopping peseta convertibility
c. Baring crisis and Méline tariff
d. 1898 crisis and end of the armed
    conflict against USA


















From	 1882,	 GDP	 again	 began	 to	 fall.	 In	 that	 same	 year,	 the	Banque	 de	 Lyon	 et	 de	 la	 Loira	
collapsed	and	the	shockwaves	spread	first	to	Paris	and	later	to	Spain.	After	the	fall	of	financial	
institutions	 in	 Lyon,	 the	 Spanish	 banks	 experienced	 cash	 withdrawals,	 bank	 failures	 and	
dwindling	gold	reserves.	 In	addition,	the	possibility	of	 importing	cheap	grain	sparked	a	major	





























In	 the	 late	eighteen-seventies,	 shocks	 in	 the	 fiscal	balance	 showed	a	downward	 trend.	 From	
1882,	the	fiscal	balance	improved	because	of	the	debt	reorganisation	carried	out	by	Camacho28.	








The	 exchange	 rate	 fluctuated	mildly	 into	 the	 eighteen-eighties.	 From	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	
decade,	however,	there	were	more	severe	impacts	on	the	value	of	the	currency.	Going	forward,	
the	peseta	tended	to	depreciate	until	1898.	In	1887-1890,	a	depreciation	helped	to	overcome	



























A	 shock	 to	 the	 i-th	 variable	 not	 only	 affects	 the	 i-th	 variable	 directly,	 but	 also	 all	 the	 other	









































































































































































show	 a	 standard	 deviation	 of	 1.96	 with	 a	 confidence	 interval	 of	 90%30.	 The	main	 aim	 is	 to	
observe	whether	monetary	policy,	fiscal	policy	or	a	flexible	exchange	rate	had	an	impact	on	the	





in	M1	or	 the	exchange	 rate	 (depreciation),	GDP	 rose31.	 In	 short,	expansionary	monetary	and	






on	 the	exchange	rate	also	had	a	positive	 impact	on	 the	exchange	rate	 itself.	 In	addition,	 the	
currency’s	loss	of	value	was	followed	by	an	increase	in	the	money	stock.	Depreciation	produced	







followed	 by	 a	 fall	 in	 interest	 rate,	which	 augmented	 exchange	 rate	 (depreciation).	 Hence,	 a	
shock	on	the	money	stock	was	followed	by	a	depreciation	of	the	peseta.	The	creation	of	liquidity	
by	 the	 monetary	 authorities	 caused	 the	 value	 of	 the	 peseta	 to	 fall.	 The	 impulse	 response	













balance	 initially	 caused	an	 increase	 in	GDP.	The	 increase	 in	public	 spending	ultimately	had	a	

















In	 this	 section,	 an	 historical	 decomposition	 analysis	 shows	 how	 the	 model	 describes	 and	
interprets	history.	The	historical	decompositions	measure	the	cumulative	contribution	of	each	
structural	shock	on	the	evolution	of	each	variable	over	time.	They	are	essential,	for	instance,	to	














into	 the	 different	 structural	 shocks.	 The	 shocks	 on	 GDP	 account	 for	 the	 largest	 part	 of	 the	
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Indeed,	 the	peseta’s	greatest	 loss	of	value	occurred	 in	1898.	Nonetheless,	 the	exchange	rate	
promoted	the	recovery	of	the	Spanish	economy	and	it	helped	to	explain	the	fluctuations	in	real	
GDP.	Changes	in	the	amount	of	money	also	explain,	though	to	a	lesser	extent	than	the	exchange	




In	 line	 with	 this	 analysis,	 politicians	 formulated	 some	 of	 their	 policies	 in	 response	 to	 the	
country’s	economic	conditions	and	to	changes	in	other	policies.	To	analyse	this,	Figures	5,	6	and	










However,	occasional	 variations	can	be	observed.	 In	 the	period	1885-1905,	 the	variations	are	
largely	explained	by	shocks	in	the	exchange	rate.	In	the	period	1890-1906,	shocks	in	the	money	
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Due to price shocks












helped	 to	 explain	 fluctuations	 in	 the	 money	 stock,	 particularly	 between	 1881	 and	 1890,	
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Due to price shocks
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Due to monetary shocks
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outside	 the	 gold	 standard.	 According	 to	 Sardà	 (1987,	 218),	 the	 fiduciary	 expansion	 brought	
about	 by	 pressure	 from	 the	 Spanish	 treasury	 was	 able	 to	 sustain	 the	 country’s	 economic	
progress.	In	the	short	term,	monetary	policy	was	one	of	the	most	powerful	tools	to	change	the	















stress	 that	 seigniorage	 was	 essential	 to	 safeguarding	 the	 state’s	 long-term	 solvency38.	 The	
Spanish	 treasury	was	 in	need	of	money,	which	 it	obtained	by	monetising	public	debt	 (Sardà,	
1987,	 pp.	 186,	 190	 and	 199).	 The	 impossibility	 of	 using	 monetary	 policy	 because	 of	 a	
commitment	to	the	gold	standard	would	have	ruled	out	action	to	counter	the	economic	impacts	
(Bordo,	Choudri	and	Schwartz,	2002,	p.	2).	In	the	Spanish	case,	the	application	of	expansionary	








another	 (see	 impulse	 response	 function).	 Lastly,	 there	was	 no	 application	 of	 fiscal	 austerity	
measures,	which	would	have	been	detrimental	to	the	Spanish	economy.		
In	the	specific	case	of	the	economic	crisis	at	the	end	of	the	eighteen-nineties,	the	statistics	on			





C	 G	 I	 V	E	 X	 M	 GDP	 Year	
-9.07%	 -0.88%	 -0.62%	 0.08%	 -1.98%	 1.04%	 -11.437%	 1893	
-0.61%	 -0.32%	 -0.08%	 0.11%	 0.24%	 -0.32%	 -0.984%	 1894	
-4.69%	 -0.15%	 0.17%	 0.12%	 -0.48%	 1.77%	 -3.259%	 1895	
-5.09%	 0.42%	 0.00%	 0.14%	 4.34%	 -1.93%	 -2.131%	 1896	
10.85%	 1.47%	 0.68%	 0.16%	 2.23%	 -1.61%	 13.776%	 1897	
8.33%	 0.79%	 0.42%	 0.10%	 -0.17%	 -0.02%	 9.459%	 1898	
2.31%	 -0.85%	 2.93%	 0.05%	 -2.28%	 -1.74%	 0.409%	 1899	


















shown	 by	 the	 SVAR	model	 including	 prices.	 Lastly,	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 fiscal	 balance	 on	 GDP	

















On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 output	 response	 to	 exchange	 rate	 increased.	 	 Anyway,	 both	 have	 a	
positive	impact.	The	historical	decomposition	of	output,	when	taking	wars	into	account,	shows	
a	slight	decreased	importance	of	shocks	on	fiscal	policy	in	the	explanation	of	GDP	fluctuations.	
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Historical decomposition of output
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Bench mark
Without v ariable prices
Historical decomposition of output
due to monetary shocks
Historical decomposition of output
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Historical decomposition of  output
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Bench mark With dummy war
Historical decomposition of  output
due to monetary  shocks
Historical decomposition of  output





















In	 the	 face	 of	 dramatic	 economic	 shocks,	 the	 rigidities	 of	 the	 monetary	 system	 inhibited	
recovery,	 particularly	 in	 countries	 on	 the	 periphery.	 The	 results	 in	 this	 paper	 provide	 new	
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Null Hypothesis: LYPC has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant    
Lag Length: 5 (Automatic - based on t-statistic, lagpval=0.1, maxlag=9)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.067000  0.7173  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.639407   
 5% level  -2.951125   
 10% level  -2.614300   
      
      *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
      
      
 
Null Hypothesis: LP has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant    
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on t-statistic, lagpval=0.1, maxlag=9)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.871934  0.3416  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.610453   
 5% level  -2.938987   
 10% level  -2.607932   
      
      *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
      
 
 
Null Hypothesis: F has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant    
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic - based on t-statistic, lagpval=0.1, maxlag=9)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.804435  0.3726  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.621023   
 5% level  -2.943427   
 10% level  -2.610263   
      
      *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   
      
 
 
Null Hypothesis: LE3 has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant    
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on t-statistic, lagpval=0.1, maxlag=9)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      
38	
	
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.554924  0.1109  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.610453   
 5% level  -2.938987   
 10% level  -2.607932   
      




Null Hypothesis: LM1 has a unit root   
Exogenous: Constant    
Lag Length: 4 (Automatic - based on t-statistic, lagpval=0.1, maxlag=9)  
      
         t-Statistic   Prob.*  
      
      Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.970472  0.7529  
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.632900   
 5% level  -2.948404   
 10% level  -2.612874   
      
      *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.   




Sample (adjusted): 1876 1913    
Included observations: 38 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend (restricted constant)  
Series: LYPC LPM F2 LE3 LM1     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.634790  103.1567  76.97277  0.0001  
At most 1 *  0.592181  64.87992  54.07904  0.0041  
At most 2  0.367951  30.79652  35.19275  0.1381  
At most 3  0.238931  13.36257  20.26184  0.3356  
At most 4  0.075605  2.987392  9.164546  0.5830  
      
       Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.634790  38.27678  34.80587  0.0185  
At most 1 *  0.592181  34.08340  28.58808  0.0089  
At most 2  0.367951  17.43395  22.29962  0.2083  
At most 3  0.238931  10.37518  15.89210  0.3014  
At most 4  0.075605  2.987392  9.164546  0.5830  
      
       Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  






VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria      
Endogenous variables: LYPC LPM F2 LE3 LM1      
Exogenous variables: C       
Date: 03/15/17   Time: 11:24      
Sample: 1874 1913       
Included observations: 37      
        
         Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ  
        
        0  323.6573 NA   2.28e-14 -17.22472 -17.00703 -17.14797  
1  431.6676  180.9903  2.60e-16 -21.71176  -20.40561*  -21.25128*  
2  462.5042   43.33790*   2.05e-16*  -22.02725* -19.63265 -21.18304  
3  486.8008  27.57996  2.63e-16 -21.98923 -18.50617 -20.76129  
        
         * indicates lag order selected by the criterion     
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)    
 FPE: Final prediction error      
 AIC: Akaike information criterion      
 SC: Schwarz information criterion      
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion     
        




VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests  
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag 
order h  
Date: 03/15/17   Time: 11:25  
Sample: 1874 1913   
Included observations: 39  
    
    Lags LM-Stat Prob  
    
    1  40.88144  0.0236  
2  28.85128  0.2702  
3  17.52672  0.8618  
4  19.22348  0.7863  
    
    Probs from chi-square with 25 df.  
    
    
    
	
V. Normality	test	
VAR Residual Normality Tests    
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)   
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal   
Date: 03/15/17   Time: 11:25    
Sample: 1874 1913     
Included observations: 39    
      
            
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob.  
40	
	
      
      1 -0.659647  2.828375 1  0.0926  
2 -0.072753  0.034404 1  0.8528  
3 -0.347734  0.785975 1  0.3753  
4 -0.289008  0.542916 1  0.4612  
5  1.556623  15.74999 1  0.0001  
      
      Joint   19.94166 5  0.0013  
      
            
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob.  
      
      1  2.646348  0.203238 1  0.6521  
2  2.709267  0.137355 1  0.7109  
3  3.730252  0.866562 1  0.3519  
4  4.223788  2.433692 1  0.1188  
5  7.162635  28.15724 1  0.0000  
      
      Joint   31.79808 5  0.0000  
      
            
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.   
      
      1  3.031614 2  0.2196   
2  0.171759 2  0.9177   
3  1.652537 2  0.4377   
4  2.976608 2  0.2258   
5  43.90723 2  0.0000   
      
      Joint  51.73974 10  0.0000   
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Bench mark Changing Y pc by Y

























1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
Output fluctuations
Bench mark









1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
Historical decomposition of  output
due to f iscal shocks
Historical decomposition of  output
due to exchange rate shocks
Historical decomposition of  output












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Bench mark
Changing M1 (money  stock) by  M2
















1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
Historical decomposition of output









1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
Output f luctuations
Bench mark
Changing M1 (money  stock) by  M2
Historical decomposition of output
due to monetary shocks
Historical decomposition of output









1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
